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Abstract
The majority of First Order methods for large-scale convex-concave saddle point problems and
variational inequalities with monotone operators are proximal algorithms which at every iteration
need to minimize over problem’s domain X the sum of a linear form and a strongly convex func-
tion. To make such an algorithm practical, X should be proximal-friendly – admit a strongly
convex function with easy to minimize linear perturbations. As a byproduct, X admits a com-
putationally cheap Linear Minimization Oracle (LMO) capable to minimize over X linear forms.
There are, however, important situations where a cheap LMO indeed is available, but X is not
proximal-friendly, which motivates search for algorithms based solely on LMO. For smooth convex
minimization, there exists a classical LMO-based algorithm – Conditional Gradient. In contrast,
known to us LMO-based techniques for other problems with convex structure (nonsmooth convex
minimization, convex-concave saddle point problems, even as simple as bilinear ones, and varia-
tional inequalities with monotone operators, even as simple as affine) are quite recent and utilize
common approach based on Fenchel-type representations of the associated objectives/vector fields.
The goal of this paper is to develop an alternative (and seemingly much simpler) decomposition
LMO-based techniques for bilinear saddle point problems and for variational inequalities with affine
monotone operators.
1 Introduction
This paper is a follow-up to our paper [17] and, same as its predecessor, is motivated by the desire to
develop first order algorithms for solving convex-concave saddle point problem (or variational inequal-
ity with monotone operator) on a convex domain X represented by Linear Minimization Oracle (LMO)
capable to minimize over X, at a reasonably low cost, any linear function. “LMO-representability” of
a convex domain X is an essentially weaker assumption than “proximal friendliness” of X (possibility
to minimize over X, at a reasonably low cost, any linear perturbation of a properly selected strongly
convex function) underlying the vast majority of known first order algorithms. There are important
applications giving rise to LMO-represented domains which are not proximal friendly, most notably
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• nuclear norm balls arising in low rank matrix recovery and in Semidefinite optimization; here
LMO reduces to approximating the leading pair of singular vectors of a matrix, while all known
proximal algorithms require much costly computationally full singular value decomposition,
• total variation balls arising in image reconstruction; here LMO reduces to solving a specific flow
problem [14], while a proximal algorithm needs to solve a much more computationally demanding
linearly constrained convex quadratic program,
• some combinatorial polytopes.
The needs of these applications inspire the current burst of activity in developing LMO-based opti-
mization techniques. In its major part, this activity was focused on smooth (or Lasso-type smooth
regularized) Convex Minimization over LMO-represented domains, where the classical Conditional
Gradient algorithm of Frank & Wolfe [7] and its modifications are applicable (see, e.g., [5, 6, 8, 9,
13, 14, 15, 16, 21] and references therein). LMO-based techniques for large-scale Nonsmooth Convex
Minimization (NCM), convex-concave Saddle Point problems (SP), even bilinear ones, and Variational
Inequalities (VI) with monotone operators, even affine ones, where no classical optimization methods
work, have been developed only recently. To the best of our knowledge, the related results reduce
to LMO-based techniques for large-scale NCM based on Nesterov’s smoothing [1, 20, 23, 24, 4, 18].
An alternative approach to NCM, based on Fenchel-type representations of convex functions and pro-
cessing the induced by these representations problems dual to the problem of interest, was developed
in [4] and was further extended in [17] to convex-concave SP’s and VI’s with monotone operators.
The goal of this paper is to develop an alternative to [17] decomposition-based approach to solving
convex-concave SP’s and monotone VI’s on LMO-represented domains. In the nutshell, this approach
is extremely simple, and it makes sense to present an informal outline of it, in the SP case, right here.
Given convex compact sets X1,X2, Y1, Y2 in Euclidean spaces, consider a convex-concave
saddle point “master” problem
min
[x1;x2]∈X1×X2
max
[y1;y2]∈Y1×Y2
Φ(x1, x2; y1, y2)
along with two “induced” problems
(P ) minx1∈X1 maxy1∈Y1 [φ(x1, y1) := minx2∈X2 maxy2∈Y2 Φ(x1, x2; y1, y2)]
(D) minx2∈X2 maxy2∈Y2 [ψ(x2, y2) := minx1∈X1 maxy1∈Y1 Φ(x1, x2; y1, y2)]
It is easily seen that (P ) and (D) are convex-concave problems and a good approximate
solution to the master problem induces straightforwardly equally good approximate so-
lutions to (P ) and to (D). More importantly, it turns out that when solving one of the
induced problems, say, (P ), by an “intelligent,” in certain precise sense, algorithm, infor-
mation acquired in course of building an ǫ-solution yields straightforwardly an ǫ-solution
to the master problem, and thus yields an ǫ-solution to the other induced problem, in our
case, to (D).
Now imagine that we want to solve a convex-concave SP problem which “as is” is too
complicated for the standard solution techniques (e.g., problem’s domain is not proximal-
friendly, or is of huge dimension). Our proposed course of actions is to make the problem
of interest the problem (D) stemming from a master problem built in a way which ensures
that the associated problem (P ) is amenable to an “intelligent” solution algorithm B. Af-
ter such a master problem is built, we solve (P ) within a desired accuracy ǫ by B and use
the acquired information to build an ǫ-solution to the problem of interest.
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As we shall see, our decomposition approach can, in principle, handle general convex-concave SP’s and
affine VI’s. Our emphasis in this paper is, however, on bilinear SP’s and on VI’s with affine operators
– the cases which, on one hand, are of primary importance in numerous applications, and, on the
other hand, are the cases where our approach is easy to implement and where this approach seems to
be more flexible and much simpler than the machinery of Fenchel-type representations developed in
[17] (and in fact even covers this machinery, see section 3.3).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In sections 2 and 3 we present our decomposition-
based approach to SP problems, resp., VI’s with monotone operators, with emphasis on utilizing
the approach to handle bilinear SP’s, resp., affine VI’s, on LMO-represented domains. We illustrate
our constructions by applying them to Colonel Blotto type matrix game (section 2.6.3) and Nash
Equilibrium with pairwise interactions (section 3.2.2); in both these illustrations, decomposition allows
to overcome difficulties coming from potentially huge ambient dimensions of the problems.
Proofs missing in the main body of the paper are relegated to Appendix.
2 Decomposition of Convex-Concave Saddle Point Problems
2.1 Situation
In this section, we focus on the situation as follows. Given are
1. convex compact sets Xi in Euclidean spaces Xi and convex compact sets Yi in Euclidean spaces
Yi, i = 1, 2;
2. convex compact sets X, Y such that
X ⊂ X1 ×X2 ⊂ X := X1 × X2, Y ⊂ Y1 × Y2 ⊂ Y := Y1 × Y2,
such that the projections of X onto Xi are the sets Xi, and projections of Y onto Yi are the
sets Yi, i = 1, 2. For x1 ∈ X1, we set X2[x1] = {x2 : [x1;x2] ∈ X} ⊂ X2, and for y1 ∈ Y1 we set
Y2[y1] = {y2 : [y1; y2] ∈ Y } ⊂ Y2. Similarly,
X1[x2] = {x1 : [x1;x2] ∈ X}, x2 ∈ X2, and Y1[y2] = {y2 : [y1; y2] ∈ Y }, y2 ∈ Y2;
3. Lipschitz continuous function
Φ(x = [x1;x2]; y = [y1; y2]) : X × Y → R (1)
which is convex in x ∈ X, and concave in y ∈ Y .
We call the outlined situation a direct product one, when X = X1 ×X2 and Y = Y1 × Y2.
2.2 Induced convex-concave functions
We associate with Φ primal and dual induced functions:
φ(x1, y1) := min
x2∈X2[x1]
max
y2∈Y2[y1]
Φ(x1, x2; y1, y2) = max
y2∈Y2[y1]
min
x2∈X2[x1]
Φ(x1, x2; y1, y2) : X1 × Y1 → R,
ψ(x2, y2) := min
x1∈X1[x2]
max
y1∈Y1[y2]
Φ(x1, x2; y1, y2) = max
y1∈Y1[y2]
min
x1∈X1[x2]
Φ(x1, x2; y1, y2) : X2 × Y2 → R.
(the equalities are due to the convexity-concavity and continuity of Φ and convexity and compactness
of Xi[·] and Yi[·]).
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Recall that a Lipschitz continuous convex-concave function θ(u, v) : U × V → R with convex
compact U, V gives rise to the primal and dual problems
Opt(P [θ, U, V ]) = min
u∈U
[
θ(u) := max
v∈V
θ(u, v)
]
Opt(D[θ, U, V ]) = max
v∈V
[
θ(v) := min
u∈U
θ(u, v)
]
with equal optimal values:
SadVal(θ, U, V ) := Opt(P [θ, U, V )] = Opt(D[θ, U, V ]),
same as gives rise to saddle point residual
ǫsad([u; v]|θ, U, V ) = θ(u)− θ(v) =
[
θ(u)−Opt(P [θ, U, V ])]+ [Opt(D[θ, U, V ])− θ(v)] .
Lemma 1. φ and ψ are convex-concave on their domains, are lower (upper) semicontinuous in their
“convex” (“concave”) arguments, and are Lipschitz continuous in the direct product case. Besides
this, it holds
SadVal(φ,X1, Y1) = SadVal(Φ,X, Y ) = SadVal(ψ,X2, Y2), (2)
and whenever x¯ = [x¯1; x¯2] ∈ X and y¯ = [y¯1; y¯2] ∈ Y , one has
ǫsad([x¯1; y¯1]|φ,X1, Y1) ≤ ǫsad([x¯; y¯]|Φ,X, Y ), ǫsad([x¯2; y¯2]|ψ,X2, Y2) ≤ ǫsad([x¯; y¯]|Φ,X, Y ). (3)
The strategy for solving SP problems we intend to develop is as follows:
1. We represent the SP problem of interest as the dual SP problem
min
x2∈X2
max
y2∈Y2
ψ(x2, y2) (D)
induced by master SP problem
min
[x1;x2]∈X
max
[y1;y2]∈Y
Φ(x1, x2; y1, y2) (M)
The master SP problem is built in such a way that the associated primal SP problem
min
x1∈X1
max
y1∈Y1
φ(x1, y1) (P )
admits First Order oracle and can be solved by a traditional First Order method (e.g., a proximal
one).
2. We solve (P ) to a desired accuracy by First Order algorithm producing accuracy certificates [19]
and use these certificates to recover approximate solution of required accuracy to the problem
of interest.
We shall see that the outlined strategy (originating from [3]1) can be easily implemented when the
problem of interest is a bilinear SP on the direct product of two LMO-represented domains.
1in hindsight, a special case of this strategy was used in [10, 11].
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2.3 Regular sub- and supergradients
Implementing the outlined strategy requires some “agreement” between the first order information of
the master and the induced SP’s, and this is the issue we address now.
Given x¯1 ∈ X1, y¯1 ∈ Y1, let x¯2 ∈ X2[x¯1] and y¯2 ∈ Y2[y¯1] form a saddle point of the function
Φ(x¯1, x2; y¯1, y2) (min in x2 ∈ X2[x¯1], max in y2 ∈ Y2[y¯1]). In this situation we say that (x¯ = [x¯1; x¯2], y¯ =
[y¯1; y¯2]) belongs to the saddle point frontier of Φ, and we denote this frontier by S. Let now z¯ = (x¯ =
[x¯1; x¯2], y¯ = [y¯1; y¯2]) ∈ S, so that the function Φ(x¯1, x2; y¯1, y¯2) attains its minimum over x2 ∈ X2[x¯1]
at x¯2, and the function Φ(x¯1, x¯2; y¯1, y2) attains its maximum over y2 ∈ Y2[y¯1] at y¯2. Consider a
subgradient G of Φ(·; y¯1, y¯2) taken at x¯ alongX: G ∈ ∂xΦ(x¯; y¯). We say that G is a regular subgradient
of Φ at z¯, if for some g ∈ E1 it holds
∀x = [x1;x2] ∈ X : 〈G,x − x¯〉 ≥ 〈g, x1 − x¯1〉;
every g satisfying this relation is called compatible with G. Similarly, we say that a supergradient H
of Φ(x¯; ·), taken at y¯ along Y is a regular supergradient of Φ at z¯, if for some h ∈ F1 it holds
∀y = [y1; y2] ∈ Y : 〈H, y − y¯〉 ≤ 〈h, y1 − y¯1〉,
and every h satisfying this relation will be called compatible with H.
Remark 1. Let X = X1×X2, Y = Y1×Y2, meaning that we are in the direct product case. If Φ(x; y¯)
is differentiable in x at x = x¯, the partial gradient ∇xΦ(x¯; y¯) is a regular subgradient of Φ at (x¯, y¯),
and ∇x1Φ(x¯; y¯) is compatible with this subgradient:
∀x = [x1;x2] ∈ X1 ×X2 :
〈∇xΦ(x¯; y¯), x− x¯〉 = 〈∇x1Φ(x¯; y¯), x1 − x¯1〉+ 〈∇x2Φ(x¯; y¯), x2 − x¯2〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
≥ 〈∇x1Φ(x¯; y¯), x1 − x¯1〉.
Similarly, if Φ(x¯; y) is differentiable in y at y = y¯, then the partial gradient ∇yΦ(x¯; y¯) is a regular
supergradient of Φ at (x¯, y¯), and ∇y1Φ(x¯; y¯) is compatible with this supergradient.
Lemma 2. In the situation of section 2.1, let z¯ = (x¯ = [x¯1; x¯2], y¯ = [y¯1; y¯2]) ∈ S, let G be a regular
subgradient of Φ at z¯ and let g be compatible with G. Let also H be a regular supergradient of Φ at z¯,
and h be compatible with H. Then g is a subgradient in x1, taken at (x¯1, y¯1) along X1, of the induced
function φ, and h is a supergradient in y1, taken at (x¯1, y¯1) along Y1, of the induced function φ:
(a) φ(x1, y¯1) ≥ φ(x¯1; y¯1) + 〈g, x1 − x¯1〉,
(b) φ(x¯1, y1) ≤ φ(x¯1; y¯1) + 〈h, y1 − y¯1〉.
for all x1 ∈ X1, y1 ∈ Y1.
Regular sub- and supergradient fields of induced functions. In the sequel, we say that
φ′x1(x1, y1), φ
′
y1
(x1, y1) are regular sub- and supergradient fields of φ, if for every (x1, y1) ∈ X1 × Y1
and properly selected x¯2, y¯2 such that the point z¯ = (x¯ = [x1; x¯2], y¯ = [y1; y¯2]) is on the SP frontier
of Φ, φ′x1(x1, y1), φ
′
y1
(x1, y1) are the sub- and supergradients of φ induced, via Lemma 2, by regular
sub- and supergradients of Φ at z¯. Invoking Remark 1, we arrive at the following observation:
Remark 2. Let X = X1 × X2, Y = Y1 × Y2, meaning that we are in the direct product case. If Φ
is differentiable in x and in y, then regular sub- and supergradient fields of φ can be built as follows:
given (x1, y1) ∈ X1× Y1, we find x¯2, y¯2 such that the point z¯ = (x¯ = [x1; x¯2], y¯ = [y1; y¯2]) is on the SP
frontier of Φ, and set
φ′x1(x1, y1) = ∇x1Φ(x1, x¯2; y1, y¯2), φ′y1(x1, y1) = ∇y1Φ(x1, x¯2; y1, y¯2). (4)
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2.3.1 Existence of regular sub- and supergradients
The notion of regular subgradient deals with Φ as a function of [x1;x2] ∈ X only, the y-argument
being fixed, so that the existence/description questions related to regular subgradient deal in fact with
a Lipschitz continuous convex function on X. And of course the questions about existence/description
of regular supergradients reduce straightforwardly to existence/decription of regular subgradients (by
swapping the roles of x’s and y’s and passing from Φ to −Φ). Thus, as far as existence and description
of regular sub- and supergradients is concerned, it suffices to consider the situation where
• Ψ(x1, x2) is a Lipschitz continuous convex function on X,
• x¯1 ∈ X1, and x¯2 ∈ X2[x¯1] is a minimizer of Ψ(x¯1, x2) over x2 ∈ X2[x¯1].
What we need to understand, is when a subgradient G of Ψ taken at x¯ = [x¯1; x¯2] along X and some
g satisfy the relation
〈G, [x1;x2]− x¯〉 ≥ 〈g, x1 − x¯1〉 ∀x = [x1;x2] ∈ X (5)
and what can be said about the corresponding g’s. The answer is as follows:
Lemma 3. With Ψ, x¯1, x¯2 as above, G ∈ ∂Ψ(x¯) satisfies (5) if and only if the following two properties
hold:
(i) G is a “certifying” subgradient of Ψ at x¯, meaning that 〈G, [0;x2 − x¯2]〉 ≥ 0 ∀x2 ∈ X2[x¯1] (the
latter relation indeed certifies that x¯2 is a minimizer of Ψ(x¯1, x2) over x2 ∈ X2[x¯1]);
(ii) g is a subgradient, taken at x¯1 along X1, of the convex function
χG(x1) = min
x2∈X2[x1]
〈G, [x1;x2]〉
It is easily seen that with Ψ, x¯ = [x¯1; x¯2] as in Lemma 3 (i.e., Ψ is convex and Lipschitz continuous
on X, x¯1 ∈ X1, and x¯2 ∈ X2[x¯1] minimizes Ψ(x¯1, x2) over x2 ∈ X2[x¯1]) a certifying subgradient G
always exists; when Ψ is differentiable at x¯, one can take G = ∇xΨ(x¯). The function χG(·), however,
not necessary admits a subgradient at x¯1; when it does admit it, every g ∈ ∂χG(x¯1), satisfies (5). In
particular,
1. [Direct Product case] When X = X1 ×X2, representing a certifying subgradient G of Ψ, taken
at [x¯1; x¯2 ∈ Argmin x2∈X2 Ψ(x¯1, x2)], as [g;h], we have
〈h, x2 − x¯2〉 ≥ 0 ∀x2 ∈ X2,
whence χG(x1) = 〈g, x1〉+ 〈h, x¯2〉, and thus g is a subgradient of χG at x¯1. In particular, in the
direct product case and when Ψ is differentiable at x¯, (5) is met by G = ∇Ψ(x¯), g = ∇x1Ψ(x¯);
2. [Polyhedral case] WhenX is a polyhedral set, for every certifying subgradientG of Ψ the function
χG is polyhedrally representable with domain X1 and as such has a subgradient at every point
from X1;
3. [Interior case] When x¯1 is a point from the relative interior of X1, χG definitely has a subgradient
at x¯1.
2.4 Main Result, Saddle Point case
2.4.1 Preliminaries: execution protocols, accuracy certificates, residuals
We start with outlining some simple concepts originating from [19]. Let W be a convex compact set
in Euclidean space W, and M(w) : W → W be a vector field on W . A t-step execution protocol
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associated withM,W is a collection It = {wi ∈W,M(wi) : 1 ≤ i ≤ t}. A t-step accuracy certificate is
a t-dimensional probabilistic (i.e., with nonnegative entries summing up to 1) vector λ. Augmenting
a t-step accuracy protocol It by t-step accuracy certificate λ gives rise to two entities:
approximate solution: wt = wt(It, λ) :=
∑t
i=1 λiwi ∈W ;
residual: Res(It, λt|W ) = max
w∈W
∑t
i=1 λi〈M(wi), wi − w〉. (6)
When W = U × V , where U is a closed convex subset of Euclidean space U and V is a closed
convex subset of Euclidean space V, andM is vector field induced by convex-concave function θ(u, v) :
U × V → R, that is,
M(u, v) = [Mu(u, v);Mv(u, v)] : U × V → U × V with Fu(u, v) ∈ ∂uθ(u, v), Fv(u, v) ∈ ∂v[−θ(u, v)]
(such a field always is monotone), an execution protocol associated with (M,W ) will be called also
protocol associated with θ, U , V , or protocol associated with the saddle point problem
min
u∈U
max
v∈V
θ(u, v).
The importance of these notions in our context stems from the following simple observation [19]:
Proposition 1. Let U , V be nonempty convex compact domains in Euclidean spaces U , V, θ(u, v) :
U × V → R be a convex-concave function, and M be induced monotone vector field: M(u, v) =
[Mu(u, v);Mv(u, v)] : U × V → U × V with Mu(u, v) ∈ ∂uθ(u, v), Mv(u, v) ∈ ∂v[−θ(u, v)]. For a
t-step execution protocol It = {wi = [ui; vi] ∈ W := U × V,Mi = [Mu(ui, vi);Mv(ui, vi)] : 1 ≤ i ≤ t}
associated with θ, U, V , and t-step accuracy certificate λ, it holds
ǫsad(w
t(It, λ)|θ, U, V ) ≤ Res(It, λ|U × V ). (7)
Indeed, for [u; v] ∈ U × V we have
Res(It, λ|U × V ) ≥
∑t
i=1 λi〈Mi, wi − [u; v]〉 =
∑t
i=1 λi[〈Mu(ui, vi), ui − u〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥θ(ui,vi)−θ(u,vi)
−〈Mv(ui, vi), vi − v〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤θ(ui,vi)−θ(ui,v)
]
≥∑ti=1 λi[θ(ui, v)− θ(u, vi)] ≥ θ(ut, v) − θ(u, vt),
where the inequalities are due to the origin ofM and convexity-concavity of θ. The resulting inequality
holds true for all [u; v] ∈ U × V , and (7) follows. 
2.4.2 Main Result
Proposition 2. In the situation and notation of sections 2.1 – 2.3, let φ be the primal convex-concave
function induced by Φ, and let
It = {[x1,i; y1,i] ∈ X1 × Y1, [αi := φ′x1(x1,i, y1,i);βi := −φ′y1(x1,i, y1,i)] : 1 ≤ i ≤ t}
be an execution protocol associated with φ, X1, Y1, where φ
′
x1
, φ′y1 are regular sub- and supergradient
fields associated with Φ, φ. Due to the origin of φ, φ′x1, φ
′
y1
, there exist x2,i ∈ X2[x1,i], Gi ∈ X ,
y2,i ∈ Y2[y1,i], and Hi ∈ Y such that
(a) Gi ∈ ∂xΦ(xi := [x1,i;x2,i], yi := [y1,i; y2,i]),
(b) Hi ∈ ∂y [−Φ(xi := [x1,i;x2,i], yi := [y1,i; y2,i])] ,
(c) 〈Gi, x− [x1,i;x2,i]〉 ≥ 〈φ′x1(x1,i, y1,i), x1 − x1,i〉∀x = [x1;x2] ∈ X,
(d) 〈Hi, y − [y1,i; y2,i]〉 ≥ 〈−φ′y1(x1,i, y1,i), y1 − y1,i〉∀y = [y1; y2] ∈ Y,
(8)
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implying that
Jt = {zi = [xi = [x1,i;x2,i]; yi = [y1,i; y2,i]], Fi = [Gi;Hi] : 1 ≤ i ≤ t}
is an execution protocol associated with Φ, X, Y . For every accuracy certificate λ it holds
Res(Jt, λ|X × Y ) ≤ Res(It, λ|X1 × Y1). (9)
As a result, given an accuracy certificate λ and setting
[xt; yt] = [[xt1;x
t
2]; [y
t
1; y
t
2]] =
t∑
i=1
λi [[x1,i;x2,i]; [y1,i; y2,i]] ,
we ensure that
ǫsad([x
t; yt]|Φ,X, Y ) ≤ Res(It, λ|X1 × Y1), (10)
whence also, by Lemma 1,
ǫsad([x
t
1; y
t
1]|φ,X1, Y1) ≤ Res(It, λ|X1 × Y1),
ǫsad([x
t
2; y
t
2]|ψ,X2, Y2) ≤ Res(It, λ|X1 × Y1),
(11)
where ψ is the dual function induced by Φ.
Proof. Let z := [[u1;u2]; [v1; v2]] ∈ X × Y . Then
∑t
i=1 λi〈Fi, zi − z〉 =
∑t
i=1 λi
[
〈Gi, [x1,i;x2,i]− [u1;u2]〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤〈φ′x1 (x1,i,y1,i),x1,i−u1〉 by (8.c)
+ 〈Hi, [y1,i; y2,i]− [v1; v2]〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤〈−φ′y1 (x1,i,y1,i),y1,i−v1〉 by (8.d)
]
≤∑ti=1 λi[〈αi, x1,i − u1〉+ 〈βi, y1,i − v1〉] ≤ Res(It, λ|X1 × Y1),
and (9) follows. 
2.5 Application: Solving bilinear Saddle Point problems on domains represented
by Linear Minimization Oracles
2.5.1 Situation
Let W be a nonempty convex compact set in RN , Z be a nonempty convex compact set in RM , and
let ψ : W × Z → R be bilinear convex-concave function:
ψ(w, z) = 〈w, p〉+ 〈z, q〉 + 〈z, Sw〉. (12)
Our goal is to solve the convex-concave SP problem
min
w∈W
max
z∈Z
ψ(w, z) (13)
given by ψ, W , Z.
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2.5.2 Simple observation
We intend to show that ψ can be represented (in fact, in many ways) as the dual function induced by
a bilinear convex-concave function Φ; this is the key element of the outlined in section 2.2 strategy for
solving (13).
In the situation described in section 2.5.1, let U ⊂ Rn, V ⊂ Rm be convex compact sets, and let
D ∈ Rm×N , A ∈ Rn×M , R ∈ Rm×n. Consider bilinear (and thus convex-concave) function
Φ(u,w; v, z) = 〈w, p +DT v〉+ 〈z, q +ATu〉 − 〈v,Ru〉 : [U ×W ]× [V × Z]→ R (14)
(the “convex” argument is (u,w), the “concave” one is (v, z)). Assume that a pair of functions
u¯(w, z) : W × Z → U,
v¯(w, z) :W × Z → V (15)
satisfies
∀(w, z) ∈W × Z : Dw = Ru¯(w, z)
∀(w, z) ∈W × Z : Az = RT v¯(w, z) (16)
Denoting u¯ = u¯(w, z), v¯ = v¯(w, z), we have
(a) 〈w,DT v¯〉 = 〈Dw, v¯〉 = 〈Ru¯, v¯〉
(b) 〈z,AT u¯〉 = 〈Az, u¯〉 = 〈u¯, RT v¯〉 = 〈Ru¯, v¯〉. (17)
Thus,
∇uΦ(u¯, w; v¯, z) = Az −RT v¯ = 0
∇vΦ(u¯, w; v¯, z) = Dw −Ru¯ = 0
whence
ψ¯(w, z) := minu∈U maxv∈V Φ(u,w; v, z) = Φ(u¯(w, z), w; v¯(w, z), z)
= 〈w, p〉 + 〈z, q〉 + 〈Dw, v¯(w, z)〉 [by (17)]
We have proved
Lemma 4. In the case of (15), (16), assuming that
〈Dw, v¯(w, z)〉 = 〈z, Sw〉 ∀(w ∈W, z ∈ Z), (18)
ψ is the dual convex-concave function induced by Φ and the domains U ×W , V × Z.
Note that there are easy ways to ensure (16) and (18).
Example 1. Here m = M , n = N , and D = AT = R = S. Assuming U ⊃ W , V ⊃ Z and setting
u¯(w, z) = w, v¯(w, z) = z, we ensure (15), (16) and (18).
Example 2. Let S = ATD with A ∈ RK×M , D ∈ RK×N . Setting m = n = K, R = IK ,
u¯(w, z) = Dw, v¯(w, z) = Az and assuming that U ⊃ DW , V ⊃ AZ, we again ensure (15), (16) and
(18).
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2.5.3 Implications
Assume that (15), (16) and (18) take place. Renaming the variables according to x1 ≡ u, y1 ≡ v,
x2 ≡ w, y2 ≡ z and setting X1 = U , X2 = W , Y1 = V , Y2 = Z, X = X1 × X2 = U × W ,
Y = Y1 × Y2 = V ×Z, we find ourselves in the direct product case of the situation of section 2.1, and
Lemma 4 says that the bilinear SP problem of interest (12), (13) is the dual SP problem associated
with the bilinear master SP problem
min
[u;w]∈U×W
max
[v;z]∈V×Z
[
Φ(u,w; v, z) = 〈w, p +DT v〉+ 〈z, q +ATu〉 − 〈Ru, v〉] (19)
Since Φ is linear in [w; z], the primal SP problem associated with (19) is
min
u≡x1∈U=X1
max
v≡y1∈V=Y1
[
φ(u, v) = min
w∈W
〈w, p +DT v〉+max
z∈Z
〈v, q +ATu〉 − 〈Ru, v〉
]
.
Assuming that W , Z allow for cheap Linear Minimization Oracles and defining w∗(·), z∗(·) according
to
w∗(ξ) ∈ Argmin
w∈W
〈w, ξ〉, z∗(η) ∈ Argmin
z∈Z
〈z, η〉,
we have
φ(u, v) = 〈w∗(p +DT v), p +DT v〉+ 〈z∗(−q −ATu), q +ATu〉 − 〈Ru, v〉,
φ′u(u, v) := Az∗(−q −ATu)−RT v ∈ ∂wφ(u, v),
φ′v(u, v) := Dw∗(p+D
T v)−Ru ∈ −∂v[−φ(u, v)],
(20)
that is, first order information on the primal SP problem
min
u∈U
max
v∈V
φ(u, v), (21)
is available. Note that since we are in the direct product case, φ′u and φ
′
v are regular sub- and
supergradient fields associated with Φ, φ.
Now let It = {[ui; vi] ∈ U × V, [γi := φ′u(ui, vi); δi := −φ′v(ui, vi)] : 1 ≤ i ≤ t} be an execution
protocol generated by a First Order algorithm as applied to the primal SP problem (21), and let
wi = w∗(p+D
T vi), zi = z∗(−q −ATui),
αi = ∇wΦ(ui, wi; vi, zi) = p+DT vi,
βi = −∇zΦ(ui, wi; vi, zi) = −q −ATui,
so that
Jt =
{
[[ui;wi]; [vi; zi]], [ [γi;αi]︸ ︷︷ ︸
∇[u;w]Φ(ui, wi; vi, zi)
; [δi;βi]︸ ︷︷ ︸
−∇[v;z]Φ(ui, wi; vi, zi)
] : 1 ≤ i ≤ t
}
is an execution protocol associated with the SP problem (19). By Proposition 2, for any accuracy
certificate λ it holds
Res(Jt, λ|U ×W × V × Z) ≤ Res(It, λ|U × V ) (22)
whence, setting
[[ut;wt]; [vt; zt]] =
t∑
i=1
λi[[ui;wi]; [vi; zi]] (23)
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and invoking Proposition 1 with Φ in the role of θ,
ǫsad([[u
t;wt]; [vt; zt]]|Φ,X1 ×X2︸ ︷︷ ︸
U×W
, Y1 × Y2︸ ︷︷ ︸
V×Z
) ≤ Res(It, λ|U × V ) (24)
whence, by Lemma 1,
ǫsad([w
t; zt]|ψ,W,Z) ≤ Res(It, λ|U × V ). (25)
We have arrived at the following
Proposition 3. In the situation of section 2.5.1, let (15), (16) and (18) take place. Then applying
to the primal SP problem (21) First Order algorithm B with accuracy certificates, t-step execution
protocol It and accuracy certificate λt generated by B yield straightforwardly a feasible solution to the
SP problem of interest (12) – (13) of the ǫsad-inaccuracy ≤ Res(It, λt|U × V ).
Note also that when the constructions from Examples 1, 2 are used, there is a significant freedom
in selecting the domain U × V of the primal problem (we only require U , V to be convex compact
sets “large enough” to ensure the inclusions mentioned in Examples), so that there is no difficulty to
enforce U , V to be proximal friendly. As a result, we can take as B a proximal First Order method,
for example, Non-Euclidean Restricted Memory Level algorithm with certificates (cf. [4]) or Mirror
Descent (cf. [17]). The efficiency estimates of these algorithms as given in [4, 17] imply that the
resulting procedure for solving the SP of interest (12) – (13) admits non-asymptotic O(1/
√
t) rate of
convergence, with explicitly computable factors hidden in O(·). The resulting complexity bound is
completely similar to the one achievable with the machinery of Fenchel-type representations [4, 17].
We are about to consider a special case where the O(1/
√
t) complexity admits a significant im-
provement.
2.6 Matrix Game case
Let S ∈ RM×N admit representation
S = ATD
with A ∈ RK×M and D ∈ RK×N . Let also W = ∆N = {w ∈ RN+ :
∑
iwi = 1}, Z = ∆M . Our goal is
to solve matrix game
min
w∈W
max
z∈Z
[ψ(w, z) = 〈z, Sw〉 = 〈Az,Dw〉] . (26)
Let U , V be convex compact sets such that
V ⊃ AZ, U ⊃ DW, (27)
and let us set
Φ(u,w; v, z) = 〈u,Az〉 + 〈v,Dw〉 − 〈u, v〉
u¯ := u¯(w, z) = Dw
v¯ := v¯(w, z) = Az
implying that
∇uΦ(u¯, w; v¯, z) = Az − v¯ = 0,
∇vΦ(u¯, w; v¯, z) = Dw − u¯ = 0,
Φ(u¯, w; v¯, z) = 〈u¯, Az〉 + 〈v¯, Dw〉 − 〈u¯, v¯〉 = 〈Dw,Az〉 + 〈Az,Dw〉 − 〈Dw,Az〉
= 〈z,ATDw〉 = ψ(w, z).
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It is immediately seen that the function ψ from (26) is nothing but the dual convex-concave function
associated with Φ (cf. Example 2), while the primal function is
φ(u, v) = Max(ATu) +Min(DT v)− 〈u, v〉; (28)
here Min(p) and Max(p) stand for the smallest and the largest entries in vector p. Applying the
strategy outlined in section 2.2, we can solve the problem of interest (26) applying to the primal SP
problem
min
u∈U
max
v∈V
[
φ(u, v) = Min(DT v) +Max(ATu)− 〈u, v〉] (29)
an algorithm with accuracy certificates and using the machinery outlined in previous sections to
convert the resulting execution protocols and certificates into approximate solutions to the problem
of interest (26).
We intend to consider a special case when the outlined approach allows to reduce a huge, but
simple, matrix game (26) to a small SP problem (29) – so small that it can be solved to high accuracy
by a cutting plane method (e.g., the Ellipsoid algorithm). This is the case when the matrices A, D in
(26) are simple.
2.6.1 Simple matrices
Given a K × L matrix B, we call B simple if, given x ∈ RK , it is easy to identify the columns B[x],
B[x] of B making the maximal, resp. the minimal, inner product with x.
When matrices A, D in (26) are simple, the first order information for the cost function φ in
the primal SP problem (29) is easy to get. Besides, all we need from the convex compact sets U , V
participating in (29) is to be large enough to ensure that U ⊃ DW and V ⊃ AZ, which allows to make
U and V simple, e.g., Euclidean balls. Finally, when the design dimension 2K of (29) is small, we have
at our disposal a multitude of linearly converging, with the converging ratio depending solely on K,
methods for solving (29), including the Ellipsoid algorithm with certificates presented in [19]. We are
about to demonstrate that the outlined situation indeed takes place in some meaningful applications.
2.6.2 Example: Knapsack generated matrices
2 Assume that we are given knapsack data, namely,
• positive integer horizon m,
• nonnegative integer bounds p¯s, 1 ≤ s ≤ m,
• positive integer costs hs, 1 ≤ s ≤ m, and positive integer budget H, and
• output functions fs(·) : {0, 1, ..., p¯s} → Rrs , 1 ≤ s ≤ m.
Given the outlined data, consider the set P of all integer vectors p = [p1; ...; pm] ∈ Rm satisfying the
following restrictions:
0 ≤ ps ≤ ps, 1 ≤ s ≤ m [range restriction]∑m
s=1 hsps ≤ H [budget restriction]
and the matrix B of the size K × Card(P), K = ∑ms=1 rs, defined as follows: the columns of B are
indexed by vectors p = [p1; ...; ps] ∈ P, and the column indexed by p is the vector
Bp = [f1(p1); ...; fm(pm)].
2The construction to follow can be easily extended from “knapsack generated” matrices to more general “Dynamic
Programming generated” ones, see section A.4 in Appendix.
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Note that assuming m, ps, rs moderate, matrix B is simple – given x ∈ RK , it is easy to find B[x]
and B[x] by Dynamic Programming.
Indeed, to identify B[x], x = [x1; ...;xm] ∈ Rr1 × ... × Rrm (identification of B[x] is
completely similar), it suffices to run for s = m,m−1, ...1 the backward Bellman recurrence
Us(h) = max
r∈Z
{Us+1(h− hsr) + 〈fs(r), xs〉 : 0 ≤ r ≤ ps, 0 ≤ h− hsr}
As(h) ∈ Argmax
r∈Z
{Us+1(h− hsr) + 〈fs(r), xs〉 : 0 ≤ r ≤ ps, 0 ≤ h− hsr}
 , h = 0, 1, ...,H,
with Um+1(·) ≡ 0, and then to recover one by one the entries ps in the index p ∈ P of B[x]
from the forward Bellman recurrence
H1 = H, p1 = A1(H1);
Hs+1 = Hs − hsps, ps+1 = As+1(Hs+1), 1 ≤ s < m.
2.6.3 Illustration: Attacker vs. Defender.
The “covering story” we intend to consider is as follows3. Attacker and Defender are preparing for a
conflict to take place on m battlefields. A pure strategy of Attacker is a vector a = [a1; ...; am], where
nonnegative integer as, 1 ≤ s ≤ m, is the number of attacking units to be created and deployed at
battlefield s; the only restrictions on a, aside of nonnegativity and integrality, are the bounds as ≤ as,
1 ≤ s ≤ m, and the budget constraint ∑ms=1 hsAas ≤ HA with positive integer hsA and HA. Similarly,
a pure strategy of Defender is a vector d = [d1; ...; dm], where nonnegative integer ds is the number
of defending units to be created and deployed at battlefield s, and the only restrictions on d, aside
of nonnegativity and integrality, are the bounds ds ≤ ds, 1 ≤ s ≤ m, and the budget constraint∑m
s=1 hsDds ≤ HD with positive integer hsD and HD. The total loss of Defender (the total gain of
Attacker), the pure strategies of the players being a and d, is
Sa,d =
m∑
s=1
[Ωs]as,ds ,
with given (as + 1) × (ds + 1) matrices Ωs. Our goal is to solve in mixed strategies the matrix game
where Defender seeks to minimize his total loss, and Attacker seeks to maximize it.
Denoting by A and D the sets of pure strategies of Attacker, resp., Defender, representing
Ωs =
rs∑
i=1
f is[gis]T , f is = [f is0 ; ...; f
is
as ], g
is = [gis0 ; ...; g
is
ds
], rs = Rank(Ω
s),
and setting
K =
∑m
s=1 rs,
Aa = [[f
1,1
a1 ; f
2,1
a1 ; ...; f
r1,1
a1 ]; [f
1,2
a2 ; f
2,2
a2 ; ...; f
r2,2
a2 ]; ...; [f
1,m
am ; f
2,m
am ; ...; f
rm,m
am ]] ∈ RK , a ∈ A,
Dd = [[g
1,1
d1
; g2,1d1 ; ...; g
r1 ,1
d1
]; [g1,2d2 ; g
2,2
d2
; ...; gr2 ,2d2 ]; ...; [g
1,m
dm
; g2,mdm ; ...; g
rm ,m
dm
]] ∈ RK , d ∈ D,
we end up with K ×M , M = Card(A), knapsack-generated matrix A with columns Aa, a ∈ A, and
K ×N , N = Card(D), knapsack-generated matrix D with columns Dd, d ∈ D, such that
S := [Sa,d]a∈A
d∈D
= ATD.
3This story is a variation of what is called “Colonel Blotto Game” in Game Theory, see, e.g., [2, 22] and references
therein.
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As a result, solving the Attacker vs. Defender game in mixed strategies reduces to solving SP problem
(26) with knapsack-generated (and thus simple) matrices A, D and thus can be reduced to convex-
concave SP (29) on the product of two K-dimensional convex compact sets. Note that in the situation
in question the design dimension 2K of (29) will, typically, be rather small (few tens or at most few
hundreds), while the design dimensions M , N of the matrix game of interest (26) can be huge.
Numerical illustration. With the data (quite reasonable in terms of the “Attacker vs. Defender”
game)
m = 8, hsA = hsD = 1, 1 ≤ s ≤ m, HA = HD = 64 = ds = as, 1 ≤ s ≤ m
and rank 1 matrices Ωs, 1 ≤ s ≤ m, the design dimensions of the problem of interest (26) are as huge
as
dimw = dim z = 97, 082, 021, 465
while the sizes of problem (29) are just
dimu = dim v = 8,
and thus (29) can be easily solved to high accuracy by the Ellipsoid method. In the numerical
experiment we are about to report4, the outlined approach allowed to solve (26) within ǫsad-inaccuracy
as small as 5.0e-9 in just 1537 steps of the Ellipsoid algorithm (110.0 sec on a medium quality laptop).
This performance is quite promising, especially when taking into account huge – nearly 1011 – sizes of
the matrix game of interest (26).
3 From Saddle Point problems to Variational Inequalities with Mono-
tone Operators
In what follows, we extend the decomposition approach (developed so far for convex-concave SP
problems) to Variational Inequalities (VI’s) with monotone operators, with the primary goal to handle
VI’s with affine monotone operators on LMO-represented domains.
3.1 Decomposition of Variational Inequalities with monotone operators
3.1.1 Situation
Let X , H be Euclidean spaces, Θ ⊂ X ×H be convex compact set, Ξ be the projection of Θ onto X ,
and H be the projection of Θ onto H. Given ξ ∈ Ξ, η ∈ H, we set
Hξ = {η : [ξ; η] ∈ Θ}, Ξη = {ξ ∈ Ξ : [ξ; η] ∈ Θ}.
We denote a point from X ×H as θ = [ξ; η] with ξ ∈ X , η ∈ H. Let, further,
Φ(ξ, η) = [Φξ(ξ, η); Φη(ξ, η)] : Θ→ X ×H
be a continuous monotone vector field.
4for implementation details, see section A.5
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3.1.2 Induced vector fields
Let ξ ∈ Ξ, and let η = η(ξ) be a somehow selected, as a function of ξ ∈ Ξ, strong solution to the VI
given by (Hξ,Φη(ξ, η)), that is,
η(ξ) ∈ Hξ & 〈Φη(ξ, η(ξ)), η − η(ξ)〉 ≥ 0 ∀η ∈ Hξ. (30)
Let us call Φ (more precisely, the pair (Φ, η(·))) η-regular, if for every ξ ∈ Ξ, there exists Ψ = Ψ(ξ) ∈ X
such that
〈Ψ(ξ), ξ′ − ξ〉 ≤ 〈Φ(ξ, η(ξ)), [ξ′; η′]− [ξ; η(ξ)]〉 ∀[ξ′; η′] ∈ Θ. (31)
Similarly, let ξ(η) be a somehow selected, as a function of η ∈ H, strong solution to the VI given by
(Ξη,Φη(ξ, η)), that is,
ξ(η) ∈ Ξη & 〈Φξ(ξ(η), η), ξ − ξ(η)〉 ≥ 0 ∀ξ ∈ Ξη. (32)
Let us call (Φ, ξ(·)) ξ-regular, if for every η ∈ H there exists Γ = Γ(η) ∈ H such that
〈Γ(η), η′ − η〉 ≤ 〈Φ(ξ(η), η), [ξ′; η′]− [ξ(η); η]〉 ∀[ξ′; η′] ∈ Θ. (33)
When (Φ, η) is η-regular, we refer to the above Ψ(·) as to a primal vector field induced by Φ 5, and
when (Φ, ξ) is ξ-regular, we refer to the above Γ(·) as to a dual vector field induced by Φ.
Example: Direct product case. This is the case where Θ = Ξ × H. In this situation, setting
Ψ(ξ) = Φξ(ξ, η(ξ)), we have for [ξ
′; η′] ∈ Θ:
〈Φ(ξ, η(ξ)), [ξ′; η′]− [ξ; η(ξ)]〉 = 〈Φξ(ξ, η(ξ)), ξ′ − ξ〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
=〈Ψ(ξ),ξ′−ξ〉
+ 〈Φη(ξ, η(ξ)), η′ − η(ξ)〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0 ∀η′∈Hξ=H
≥ 〈Ψ(ξ), ξ′ − ξ〉,
that is, (Φ, η(·)) is η-regular, with Ψ(ξ) = Φξ(ξ, η(ξ)). Setting Γ(η) = Φη(ξ(η), η), we get by similar
argument
〈Φ(ξ(η)), [ξ′; η′]− [ξ; η]〉 ≥ 〈Γ(η), η′ − η〉, η, η′ ∈ H,
that is, (Φ, ξ(·)) is ξ-regular, with Γ(η) = Φη(ξ(η), η).
3.1.3 Main Result, Variational Inequality case
3.1.4 Preliminaries
Recall that the (Minty’s) variational inequality VI(M,W ) associated with a convex compact subset
W of Euclidean space W and a vector field M : W →W is
find w ∈W : 〈M(w′), w′ −w〉 ≥ 0 ∀w′ ∈W VI(M,W )
w satisfying the latter condition is called a weak solution to the VI. A natural measure of inaccuracy
for an approximate solution w ∈W to VI(M,W ) is the dual gap function
ǫVI(w|M,W ) = sup
w′∈W
〈M(w′), w −w′〉;
weak solutions to the VI are exactly the points of W where this (clearly nonnegative everywhere on
W ) function is zero.
In the sequel we utilize the following simple fact originating from [19]:
5“a primal” instead of “the primal” reflects the fact that Ψ is not uniquely defined by Φ – it is defined by Φ and η
and by how the values of Ψ are selected when (31) does not specify these values uniquely.
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Proposition 4. Let M be monotone on W , let It = {wi ∈ W,M(wi) : 1 ≤ i ≤ t} be a t-step
execution protocol associated with (M,W ), λ be a t-step accuracy certificate, and wt =
∑t
i=1 λiwi be
the associated approximate solution. Then
ǫVI(w
t|M,W ) ≤ Res(It, λ|W ).
Indeed, we have
Res(It, λ|W ) = supw′∈W
[∑t
i=1 λi〈M(wi), wi − w′〉
]
≥ supw′∈W
[∑t
i=1 λi〈M(w′), wi −w′〉
]
[since M is monotone]
= supw′∈W 〈M(w′), wt − w′〉 = ǫVI(wt|M,W ).

3.1.5 Main result
Proposition 5. In the situation of section 3.1.1, let (Φ, η(·)) be η-regular. Then
(i) Primal vector field Ψ(ξ) induced by (Φ, η(·)) is monotone on Ξ. Moreover, whenever It = {ξi ∈
Ξ,Ψ(ξi) : 1 ≤ i ≤ t} and Jt = {θi := [ξi; η(ξi)],Φ(θi) : 1 ≤ i ≤ t} and λ is a t-step accuracy certificate,
it holds
ǫVI(
t∑
i=1
λiθi|Φ,Θ) ≤ Res(Jt, λ|Θ) ≤ Res(It, λ|Ξ). (34)
(ii) Let (Φ, ξ) be ξ-regular, and let Γ be the induced dual vector field. Whenever θ̂ = [ξ̂; η̂] ∈ Θ, we
have
ǫVI(η̂|Γ,H) ≤ ǫVI(θ̂|Φ,Θ). (35)
3.2 Implications
In the situation of section 3.1.1, assume that for properly selected η(·), ξ(·), (Φ, η(·)) is η-regular,
and (Φ, ξ(·)) is ξ-regular, induced primal and dual vector fields being Ψ and Γ. In order to solve the
dual VI VI(Γ,H), we can apply to the primal VI VI(Ψ,Ξ) an algorithm with accuracy certificates; by
Proposition 5.i, resulting t-step execution protocol It = {ξi,Ψ(ξi) : 1 ≤ i ≤ t} and accuracy certificate
λ generate an execution protocol Jt = {θi := [ξi; η(ξi)],Φ(θi) : 1 ≤ i ≤ t} such that
Res(Jt, λ|Θ) ≤ Res(It, λ|Ξ),
whence, by Proposition 4, for the approximate solution
θt = [ξt, ηt] :=
T∑
i=1
λiθi =
t∑
i=1
λi[ξi; η(ξi)]
it holds
ǫVI(θ
t|Φ,Θ) ≤ Res(It, λ|Ξ).
Invoking Proposition 5.ii, we conclude that ηt is a feasible solution to the dual VI VI(Γ,H), and
ǫVI(η
t|Γ,H) ≤ Res(It, λ|Ξ). (36)
We are about to present two examples well suited for the just outlined approach.
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3.2.1 Solving affine monotone VI on LMO-represented domain
Let H be a convex compact set in H = RN , and let H be equipped with an LMO. Assume that we
want to solve the VI VI(F,H), where
F (η) = Sη + s
is an affine monotone operator (so that S+ST  0). Let us set X = H, select Ξ as a proximal-friendly
convex compact set containing H, and set Θ = Ξ×H,
Φ(ξ, η) =
[
ST −ST
S
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
S
[
ξ
η
]
+
[
0
s
]
.
We have
S + ST =
[
S + ST
]
 0,
so that Φ is an affine monotone operator with
Φξ(ξ, η) = S
T ξ − ST η
Φη(ξ, η) = Sξ + s
Setting ξ(η) = η, we ensure that ξ(η) ∈ Ξ when η ∈ H and Φξ(ξ(η), η) = 0, implying (32). Since we
are in the direct product case, we can set Γ(η) = Φη(ξ(η), η) = Sη + s = F (η); thus, VI(Γ,H) is our
initial VI of interest. On the other hand, setting
η(ξ) ∈ Argmin
η∈H
〈Sξ + s, η〉,
we ensure (30). Since we are in the direct product case, we can set
Ψ(ξ) = Φξ(ξ, η(ξ)) = S
T [ξ − η(ξ)];
note that the values of Ψ can be straightforwardly computed via calls to the LMO representing H. We
can now solve VI(Ψ,Ξ) by a proximal algorithm B with accuracy certificates and recover, as explained
above, approximate solution to the VI of interest VI(F,H). With the Non-Euclidean Restricted
Memory Level method with certificates [4] or Mirror Descent with certificates (see, e.g., [17]), the
approach results in non-asymptotical O(1/
√
t)-converging algorithm for solving the VI of interest,
with explicitly computable factors hidden in O(·). This complexity bound, completely similar to the
one obtained in [17], seems to be the best known under the circumstances.
3.2.2 Solving skew-symmetric VI on LMO-represented domain
Let H be an LMO-represented convex compact domain in H = RN , and assume that we want to solve
VI(F,H), where
F (η) = 2QTPη + f : H → H
with K ×N matrices P,Q such that the matrix QTP is skew-symmetric:
QTP + P TQ = 0. (37)
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Let X = RK ×RK , let Ξ1, Ξ2 be two convex compact sets in RK such that
QH ⊂ Ξ1,−PH ⊂ Ξ2. (38)
Let us set Ξ = Ξ1 × Ξ2, and let
Φ(ξ = [ξ1; ξ2], η) =
 IK P−IK Q
−P T −QT
 ξ1ξ2
η
+
 00
f
 .
Note that Φ is monotone and affine. Setting
ξ(η) = [Qη;−Pη]
and invoking (38), we ensure (32); since we are in the direct product case, we can take, as the dual
induced vector field,
Γ(η) = Φη(ξ(η), η) = −P T (Qη)−QT (−Pη) + f = [QTP − P TQ]η + f =︸︷︷︸
by (37)
2QTPη + f = F (η),
so that the dual VI VI(Γ,H) is our VI of interest.
On the other hand, setting
η(ξ = [ξ1; ξ2]) ∈ Argmin
η∈H
〈f − P T ξ1 −QT ξ2, η〉,
we ensure (30). Since we are in the direct product case, we can define primal vector field as
Ψ(ξ = [ξ1; ξ2]) = Φξ([ξ1; ξ2], η([ξ1; ξ2])) =
[
ξ2 + Pη(ξ)
−ξ1 +Qη(ξ)
]
.
Note that LMO for H allows to compute the values of Ψ, and that Ξ can be selected to be proximal-
friendly. We can now solve VI(Ψ,Ξ) by a proximal algorithm B with accuracy certificates and recover,
as explained above, approximate solution to the VI of interest VI(F,H). When the design dimension
dimΞ of the primal VI is small, other choices of B, like the Ellipsoid algorithm, are possible, and
in this case we can end up with linearly converging, with the converging ratio depending solely on
dimΞ, algorithm for solving the VI of interest. We are about to give a related example, which can be
considered as multi-player version of the “Attacker vs. Defender” game.
Example: Nash Equilibrium with pairwise interactions. Consider the situation as follows:
there are
• L ≥ 2 players, ℓ-th of them selecting a mixed strategy wℓ from probabilistic simplex ∆Nℓ of
dimension Nℓ,
• encoding matrices Dℓ of sizes mℓ ×Nℓ, and loss matrices M ℓℓ′ of sizes mℓ ×mℓ′ such that
M ℓℓ = 0,M ℓℓ
′
= −[M ℓ′ℓ]T , 1 ≤ ℓ, ℓ′ ≤ L.
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• The loss of ℓ-th player depends on mixed strategies of the players according to
Lℓ(η := [w1; ...;wL]) =
L∑
ℓ′=1
wTℓ E
ℓℓ′wℓ′ , E
ℓℓ′ = DTℓ M
ℓℓ′Dℓ′ + 〈gℓ, η〉.
In other words, every pair of distinct players ℓ, ℓ′ are playing matrix game with matrixM ℓℓ
′
, and
the loss of player ℓ, up to a linear in [w1; ...;wL] function, is the sum, over the pairwise games
he is playing, of his losses in these games, the “coupling constraints” being expressed by the
requirement that every player uses the same mixed strategy in all pairwise games he is playing.
We have described convex Nash Equilibrium problem, meaning that for every ℓ, Lℓ(w1, ..., wL) is
convex (in fact, linear) in wℓ, is jointly concave (in fact, linear) in w
ℓ := (w1, ..., wℓ−1, wℓ+1, ..., wL),
and
∑L
ℓ=1 Lℓ(η) is the linear function 〈g, η〉, g =
∑
ℓ gℓ, and thus is convex. It is known (see, e.g.,
[19]) that Nash Equilibria in convex Nash problem are exactly the weak solutions to the VI given by
monotone operator
F (η := [w1; ...;wL]) = [∇w1L1(η); ...;∇wLLL(η)]
on the domain
H = ∆N1 × ...×∆NL .
Let us set
Q =
1
2

D1
D2
. . .
DL
 , P =

M1,1D1 M
1,2D2 ... M
1,LDL
M2,1D1 M
2,2D2 ... M
2,LDL
...
...
. . . ...
ML,1D1 M
L,2D2 ... M
L,LDL
 .
Then
QTP =
1
2

DT1M
1,1D1 D
T
1M
1,2D2 ... D
T
1M
1,LDL
DT2M
2,1D1 D
T
2M
2,2D2 ... D
T
2M
1,LDL
...
...
. . . ...
DTLM
L,1D1 D
T
LM
L,2D2 ... D
T
LM
L,LDL

so that QTP is skew-symmetric due to M ℓℓ
′
= −[M ℓ′ℓ]T . Besides this, we clearly have
F (η := [w1; ...;wL]) = 2Q
TPη + f, f = [∇w1〈g1, [w1; ...;wL]〉; ...;∇wL〈gL, [w1; ...;wL]〉].
Observe that if D1, ...,DL are simple, so are Q and P .
Indeed, for Q this is evident: to find the column of Q which makes the largest inner product
with x = [x1; ...;xL], dimxℓ = mℓ, it suffices to find, for every ℓ, the column of Dℓ which
makes the maximal inner product with xℓ, and then to select the maximal of the resulting
L inner products and the corresponding to this maximum column of Q. To maximize the
inner product of the same x with columns of P , note that
xTP =
[
[
∑L
ℓ=1
xTℓ M
ℓ,1]︸ ︷︷ ︸
yT1
D1, ..., [
∑L
ℓ=1
xTℓ M
ℓ,L]︸ ︷︷ ︸
yTL
DL
]
,
so that to maximize the inner product of x and the columns of P means to find, for every
ℓ, the column of Dℓ which makes the maximal inner product with yℓ, and then to select
the maximal of the resulting L inner products and the corresponding to this maximum
column of P .
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We see that if Dℓ are simple, we can use the approach from section 3.2.2 to approximate the solution
to the VI generated by F on H. Note that in the case in question the dual gap function ǫVI(η|F,H)
admits a transparent interpretation in terms of the Nash Equilibrium problem we are solving: for
η = [w1; ...;wL] ∈ H, we have
ǫVI(η|F,H) ≥ ǫNash(η) :=
L∑
ℓ=1
[
Lℓ(η)− min
w′
ℓ
∈∆Nℓ
Lℓ(w1, ..., wℓ−1, w′ℓ, wℓ+1, ..., wL)
]
, (39)
and the right hand side here is the sum, over the players, of the (nonnegative) incentives for a player ℓ
to deviate from his strategy wℓ to another mixed strategy when all other players stick to their strategies
as given by η. Thus, small ǫVI([w1; ...;wL]|·, ·) means small incentives for the players to deviate from
mixed strategies wℓ.
Verification of (39) is immediate: denoting fℓ = ∇wℓ〈gℓ, w〉, by definition of ǫVI we have
for every η′ = [w′1; ...;w
′
L] ∈ H:
ǫVI(η|F,H) ≥ 〈F (η′), η − η′〉 =
∑
ℓ〈∇wℓLℓ(η′), wℓ − w′ℓ〉
=
∑
ℓ〈fℓ, wℓ − w′ℓ〉+
∑
ℓ,ℓ′〈DTℓ M ℓℓ
′
Dℓ′w
′
ℓ′ , wℓ − w′ℓ〉
=
∑
ℓ〈fℓ, wℓ − w′ℓ〉+
∑
ℓ,ℓ′〈DTℓ M ℓℓ
′
Dℓ′wℓ′ , wℓ − w′ℓ〉
[since
∑
ℓ,ℓ′〈DTℓ M ℓℓ
′
Dℓ′zℓ′ , zℓ〉 = 0 due to M ℓℓ′ = −[M ℓ′ℓ]T ]
=
∑
ℓ〈∇wℓL(η), wℓ − w′ℓ〉 =
∑
ℓ[Lℓ(η)− Lℓ(w1, ..., wℓ−1, w′ℓ, wℓ+1, ..., wL)]
[since Lℓ is affine in wℓ]
and (39) follows.
3.3 Relation to [17]
Here we demonstrate that the decomposition approach to solving VI’s with monotone operators on
LMO-represented domains cover the approach, based on Fenchel-type representations, developed in
[17]. Specifically, let H be a compact convex set in Euclidean space H = RN , G(·) be a monotone
vector field on H, and η 7→ Ax+ a be an affine mapping from H to Euclidean space X = RM . Given
a convex compact set Ξ ⊂ X , let us set
Θ = Ξ×H, Φ(ξ, η) = [Φξ(ξ, η) := Aη + a; Φη(ξ, η) := G(η) −AT ξ] : Θ→ X ×H, (40)
so that Φ clearly is a monotone vector field on Θ. Assume that η(ξ) : Ξ → H is a somehow selected
strong solution to VI(Φη(ξ, ·),H):
∀ξ ∈ Ξ : η(ξ) ∈ H & 〈G(η(ξ))−AT ξ, η − η(ξ)〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
=〈Φη(ξ,η(ξ)),η−η(ξ)〉
≥ 0∀η ∈ H; (41)
(cf. (30)); note that required η(ξ) definitely exists, provided that G(·) is continuous and monotone.
Let us also define ξ(η) as a selection of the point-to-set mapping η 7→ Argmin
ξ∈Ξ
〈Aη + a, ξ〉, so that
∀η ∈ H : ξ(η) ∈ Ξ & 〈Aη + a, ξ − ξ(η)〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
=〈Φξ(ξ(η),η),ξ−ξ(η)〉
≥ 0,∀ξ ∈ Ξ (42)
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(cf. (32)).
Observe that with the just defined Ξ, H, Θ, Φ, η(·), ξ(·) we are in the direct product case of the
situation described in section 3.1.1. Since we are in the direct product case, (Φ, η(·)) is η-regular, and
we can take, as the induced primal vector field associated with (Φ, η(·)), the vector field
Ψ(ξ) = Aη(ξ) + a = Φξ(ξ, η(ξ)) : Ξ→ X , (43)
and as the induced dual vector field, the field
Γ(η) = G(η) −AT ξ(η) = Φη(ξ(η), η) : H → X .
Note that in terms of [17], relations (43) and (41), modulo notation, form what in the reference is
called a Fenchel-type representation (F.-t.r.) of vector field Ψ : Ξ→ X , the data of the representation
being H, A, a, η(·), G(·), H. On a closer inspection, every F.-t.r. of a given monotone vector field
Ψ : Ξ→ X can be obtained in this fashion from some setup of the form (40).
Assume now that Ξ is LMO-representable, and we have at our disposal G-oracle which, given on
input η ∈ H, returnsG(η). This oracle combines with LMO for Ξ to induce a procedure which, given on
input η ∈ H, returns Γ(η). As a result, we can apply the decomposition machinery presented in sections
3.1, 3.2 to reduce solving VI(Ψ,Ξ) to processing VI(Γ,H) by an algorithm with accuracy certificates.
It can be easily seen by inspection that this reduction recovers constructions and results presented in
[17, sections 1 – 4]. The bottom line is that the developed in sections 3.1, 3.2 decomposition-based
approach to solving VI’s with monotone operators on LMO-represented domains essentially covers the
developed in [17] approach based on Fenchel-type representations of monotone vector fields6.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
It suffices to prove the φ-related statements. Lipschitz continuity of φ in the direct product case is
evident. Further, the function θ(x1, x2; y1) = max
y2∈Y2[y1]
Φ(x1, x2; y1, y2) is convex and Lipschitz con-
tinuous in x = [x1;x2] ∈ X for every y1 ∈ Y1, whence φ(x1, y1) = min
x2∈X2[x1]
θ(x1, x2; y1) is convex
and lower semicontinuous in x1 ∈ X1 (note that X is compact). On the other hand, φ(x1, y1) =
max
y2∈Y2[y1]
min
x2∈X2[x1]
Φ(x1, x2; y1, y2) = max
y2∈Y2[y1]
[
χ(x1; y1, y2) := min
x2∈X2[x1]
Φ(x1, x2; y1, y2)
]
, so that χ(x1; y1, y2)
is concave and Lipschitz continuous in y = [y1; y2] ∈ Y for every x1 ∈ X1, whence
φ(x1, y1) = max
y2∈Y2[y1]
χ(x1; y1, y2)
is concave and upper semicontinuous in y1 ∈ Y1 (note that Y is compact).
Next, we have
SadVal(φ,X1,X2) = inf
x1∈X1
[
sup
y1∈Y1
[
sup
y2:[y1;y2]∈Y
inf
x2:[x1;x2]∈X
Φ(x1, x2; y1, y2)
]]
= inf
x1∈X1
[
sup
[y1;y2]∈Y
inf
x2:[x1;x2]∈X
Φ(x1, x2; y1, y2)
]
= inf
x1∈X1
[
inf
x2:[x1;x2]∈X
sup
[y1;y2]∈Y
Φ(x1, x2; y1, y2)
]
[by Sion-Kakutani Theorem]
= inf
[x1;x2]∈X
sup
[y1;y2]∈Y
Φ(x1, x2; y1, y2) = SadVal(Φ,X, Y ),
as required in (2). Finally, let x¯ = [x¯1; x¯2] ∈ X and y¯ = [y¯1; y¯2] ∈ Y . We have
φ(x¯1)− SadVal(φ,X1, Y1) = φ(x¯1)− SadVal(Φ,X, Y ) [by (2)]
= sup
y1∈Y1
φ(x¯1, y1)− SadVal(Φ,X, Y )
= sup
y1∈Y1
sup
y2:[y1;y2]∈Y
inf
x2:[x¯1;x2]∈X
Φ(x¯1, x2; y1, y2)− SadVal(Φ,X, Y )
= sup
[y1;y2]∈Y
inf
x2:[x¯1;x2]∈X
Φ(x¯1, x2; y1, y2)− SadVal(Φ,X, Y )
= inf
x2:[x¯1;x2]∈X
sup
y=[y1;y2]∈Y
Φ(x¯1, x2; y)− SadVal(Φ,X, Y )
≤ sup
y=[y1;y2]∈Y
Φ(x¯1, x¯2; y)− SadVal(Φ,X, Y )
= Φ(x¯)− SadVal(Φ,X, Y )
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and
SadVal(φ,X1, Y1)− φ(y¯1) = SadVal(Φ,X, Y )− φ(y¯1) [by (2)]
= SadVal(Φ,X, Y )− inf
x1∈X1
φ(x1, y¯1)
= SadVal(Φ,X, Y )− inf
x1∈X1
[
inf
x2:[x1;x2]∈X
sup
y2:[y¯1;y2]∈Y
Φ(x1, x2; y¯1, y2)
]
= SadVal(Φ,X, Y )− inf
x=[x1;x2]∈X
sup
y2:[y¯1;y2]∈Y
Φ(x; y¯1, y2)
≤ SadVal(Φ,X, Y )− inf
x=[x1;x2]∈X
Φ(x; y¯1, y¯2)
= SadVal(Φ,X, Y )− Φ(y¯).
We conclude that
ǫsad([x¯1; y¯1]|φ,X1, Y1) =
[
φ(x¯1)− SadVal(φ,X1, Y1)
]
+
[
SadVal(φ,X1, Y1)− φ(y¯1)
]
≤ [Φ(x¯)− SadVal(Φ,X, Y )]+ [SadVal(Φ,X, Y )− Φ(y¯)] = ǫsad([x¯; y¯]|Φ,X, Y ),
as claimed in (3). 
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
For x1 ∈ X1 we have
φ(x1; y¯1) = min
x2:[x1;x2]∈X
max
y2:[y¯1;y2]∈Y
Φ(x1, x2; y¯1, y2) ≥ min
x2:[x1;x2]∈X
Φ(x1, x2; y¯1, y¯2)
≥ min
x2:[x1;x2]∈X
[
Φ(x¯; y¯)︸ ︷︷ ︸
φ(x¯1;y¯1))
+〈G, [x1;x2]− [x¯1; x¯2]
]〉 [since Φ(x; y¯) is convex and G ∈ ∂xΦ(x¯; y¯)]
≥ φ(x¯1; y¯1) + 〈g, x1 − x¯1〉 [by definition of g,G],
as claimed in (a). “Symmetric” reasoning justifies (b). 
A.3 Proof of Lemma 3
Assume that (5) holds true. Then G clearly is certifying, implying that
χG(x¯1) = 〈G, [x¯1; x¯2]〉,
and therefore (5) reads
〈G, [x1;x2]〉 ≥ χG(x¯1) + 〈g, x1 − x¯1〉 ∀x = [x1;x2] ∈ X,
where, taking minimum in the left hand side over x2 ∈ X2[x1],
χG(x1) ≥ χG(x¯1) + 〈g, x1 − x¯1〉 ∀x1 ∈ X1,
as claimed in (ii).
Now assume that (i) and (ii) hold true. By (i), χG(x¯1) = 〈G, [x¯1; x¯2]〉, and by (ii) combined with
the definition of χG,
∀x = [x1;x2] ∈ X : 〈G, [x1;x2]〉 ≥ χG(x1) ≥ χG(x¯1) + 〈g, x1 − x¯1〉 = 〈G, x¯〉+ 〈g, x1 − x¯1〉,
implying (5). 
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A.4 Dynamic Programming generated simple matrices
Consider the situation as follows. There exists an evolving in time system S, with state ξs at time
s = 1, 2, ...,m belonging to a given finite nonempty set Ξs. Further, every pair (ξ, s) with s ∈ {1, ...,m},
ξ ∈ Ξs is associated with nonempty finite set of actions Asξ, and we set
Ss = {(ξ, a) : ξ ∈ Ξs, a ∈ Asξ}.
Further, for every s, 1 ≤ s < m, a transition mapping πs(ξ, a) : Ss → Ξs+1 is given. Finally, we are
given vector-valued functions (”outputs”) χs : Ss → Rrs .
A trajectory of S is a sequence {(ξs, as) : 1 ≤ s ≤ m} such that (ξs, as) ∈ Ss for 1 ≤ s ≤ m and
ξs+1 = πs(ξs, as), 1 ≤ s < m.
The output of a trajectory τ = {(ξs, as) : 1 ≤ s ≤ m} is the block-vector
χ[τ ] = [χ1(ξ1, a1); ...;χm(ξm, am)].
We can associate with S the matrix D = D[S] with K = r1+ ...+ rm rows and with columns indexed
by the trajectories of S; specifically, the column indexed by a trajectory τ is χ[τ ].
For example, knapsack generated matrix D associated with knapsack data from section
2.6.2 is of the form D[S] with system S as follows:
• Ξs, s = 1, ...,m, is the set of nonnegative integers which are ≤ H;
• Asξ is the set of nonnegative integers a such that a ≤ p¯s and ξ − hsps ≥ 0;
• the transition mappings are πs(ξ, a) = ξ − ahs;
• the outputs are χs(ξ, a) = fs(a), 1 ≤ s ≤ m.
In the notation from section 2.6.2, vectors [p1; ...; pm] ∈ P are exactly the sequences of
actions a1, ..., am stemming from the trajectories of the just defined system S.
Observe that matrix D = D[S] is simple, provided the cardinalities of Ξs and Asξ are reasonable.
Indeed, given x = [x1; ...;xm] ∈ Rn = Rr1× ...×Rrm , we can identify D[x] by Dynamic Programming,
running first the backward Bellman recurrence
Us(ξ) = max
a∈Asξ
{
xTs χs(ξ, a) + Us+1(πs(ξ, a))
}
As(ξ) = Argmax
a∈As
ξ
{
xTs χs(ξ, a) + Us+1(πs(ξ, a))
}
 , ξ ∈ Ξs, s = m,m− 1, ..., 1
(where Um+1(·) ≡ 0), and then identifying the (trajectory indexing the) column of D corresponding
to D[x] by running the forward Bellman recurrence
ξ1 ∈ Argmax ξ∈Ξ1 U1(ξ)⇒ a1 ∈ A1(ξ1)⇒ ...
⇒ ξs+1 = πs(ξs, as)⇒ as+1 ∈ As+1(ξs+1)⇒ ... , s = 1, 2, ...,m − 1.
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A.5 Attacker vs. Defender via Ellipsoid algorithm
In our implementation,
1. Relation (38) is ensured by specifying U , V as centered at the origin Euclidean balls of radius
R, where R is an upper bound on the Euclidean norms of the columns in D and in A (such a
bound can be easily obtained from the knapsack data specifying the matrices D, A).
2. We processed the monotone vector field associated with the primal SP problem (29), that is, the
field
F (u, v) = [Fu(u, v) = A[u]− v;Fv(u, v) = u−D[v]]
by Ellipsoid algorithm with accuracy certificates from [19]. For τ = 1, 2, ..., the algorithm
generates search points [uτ ; vτ ] ∈ RK ×RK , with [u1; v1] = 0, along with execution protocols
Iτ = {[ui; vi], F (ui, vi) : i ∈ Iτ}, where Iτ = {i ≤ τ : [ui; vi] ∈ U × V }, augmented by accuracy
certificates λτ = {λτi ≥ 0 : i ∈ Iτ} such that
∑
i∈Iτ
λτi = 1. From the results of [19] it follows
that for every ǫ > 0 it holds
τ ≥ N(ǫ) := O(1)K2 ln
(
2
R+ ǫ
ǫ
)
⇒ Res(Iτ , λτ |U × V ) ≤ ǫ. (44)
3. When computing F (ui, vi) (this computation takes place only at productive steps – those with
[ui; vi] ∈ U × V ), we get, as a byproduct, the columns Ai = A[ui] and Di = D[vi] of matrices A,
D, along with the indexes ai, di of these columns (recall that these indexes are pure strategies
of Attacker and Defender and thus, according to the construction of A, D, are collections of m
nonnegative integers). In our implementation, we stored these columns, same as their indexes
and the corresponding search points [ui; vi]. As is immediately seen, in the case in question the
approximate solution [wτ ; zτ ] to the SP problem of interest (26) induced by execution protocol
Iτ and accuracy certificate λτ is comprised of two sparse vectors
wτ =
∑
i∈Iτ
λτi δ
D
di , z
τ =
∑
i∈Iτ
λτi δ
A
ai (45)
where δDd is the “d-th basic orth” in the simplex ∆N of probabilistic vectors with entries in-
dexed by pure strategies of Defender, and similarly for δAa . Thus, we have no difficulties with
representing our approximate solutions7, in spite of their huge ambient dimension.
According to our general theory and (44), the number of steps needed to get an ǫ-solution [w; z] to
the problem of interest (i.e., a feasible solution with ǫsad([w; z]|ψ,W,Z) ≤ ǫ) does not exceed N(ǫ),
with computational effort per step dominated by the necessity to identify A[ui], D[vi] by Dynamic
Programming.
In fact, we used the outlined scheme with two straightforward modifications.
• First, instead of building the accuracy certificates λτ according to the rules from [19], we used
the best, given execution protocols Iτ , accuracy certificates by solving the convex program
min
λ
{
Res(Iτ , λ|U × V ) := max
y∈U×V
∑
i∈Iτ
λi〈F (ui, vi), [ui; vi]− y〉 : λi ≥ 0,
∑
i∈Iτ
λi = 1
}
(46)
7Note that applying Caratheodory theorem, we could further “compress” the representations of approximate solutions
– make these solutions convex combinations of at most K + 1 of δDdi ’s and δ
A
ai ’s.
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In our implementation, this problem was solved from time to time, specifically, once per 4K2
steps. Note that with U , V being Euclidean balls, (46) is well within the scope of Matlab Convex
Programming solver CVX [12].
• Second, given current approximate solution (45) to the problem of interest, we can compute its
saddle point inaccuracy exactly instead of upper-bounding it by Res(Iτ , λτ |U × V ). Indeed, it
is immediately seen that
ǫsad([w
τ ; zτ ]|ψ,W,Z) = Max(AT [
∑
i∈Iτ
λτiD
i])−Min(DT [
∑
i∈Iτ
λτiA
i]).
In our implementation, we performed this computation each time when a new accuracy certificate
was computed, and terminated the solution process when the saddle point inaccuracy became
less than a given threshold (1.e-4).
A.6 Proof of Proposition 5
(i): Let ξ1, ξ2 ∈ Ξ, and let η1 = η(ξ1), η2 = η(ξ2). By (31) we have
〈Ψ(ξ2), ξ2 − ξ1) ≥ 〈Φ(ξ2, η2), [ξ2 − ξ1; η2 − η1]〉
〈Ψ(ξ1), ξ1 − ξ2) ≥ 〈Φ(ξ1, η1), [ξ1 − ξ2; η1 − η2]〉
Summing inequalities up, we get
〈Ψ(ξ2)−Ψ(ξ1), ξ2 − ξ1〉 ≥ 〈Φ(ξ2, η2)− Φ(ξ1, η1), [ξ2 − ξ1; η2 − η1]〉 ≥ 0,
so that Ψ is monotone.
Further, the first inequality in (34) is due to Proposition 4. To prove the second inequality in (34),
let It = {ξi ∈ Ξ,Ψ(ξi) : 1 ≤ i ≤ t}, Jt = {θi := [ξi; η(ξi)],Φ(θi) : 1 ≤ i ≤ t}, and let λ be t-step
accuracy certificate. We have
θ = [ξ; η] ∈ Θ⇒∑t
i=1 λi〈Φ(θi), θi − θ〉 ≤
∑t
i=1 λi〈Ψ(ξi), ξi − ξ〉 [see (31)]
≤ Res(It, λ|Ξ)
⇒ Res(Jt, λ|Θ) = supθ=[ξ;η]∈Θ
∑t
i=1 λi〈Φ(θi), θi − θ〉 ≤ Res(It, λ|Ξ).
(i) is proved.
(ii): Let η ∈ H. Invoking (33), we have
〈Γ(η), η̂ − η〉 ≤ 〈Φ(ξ(η), η), [ξ̂; η̂]− [ξ(η); η]〉 ≤ ǫVI(θ̂|Φ,Θ),
and (35) follows. 
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